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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES B. PETTY, et. al.,
PARTNERS, dba PETTY
INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.

10274

GINDY MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF
PLAINTIFFS STATEMENT OF ERRORS
Come now the appellants dba Petty Investment
Company and respectfully petition the Supreme
Court of Utah for a rehearing of the above entitled
cause and for its order for a new trial in the District
Court or in the alternative for a new opinion and
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decision for the plaintiffs based on what the appel.
!ants respectfully and strongly urge are two chiPf
errors of law and an additional series of cumulati1.,
legal errors which led to application of wrong prin.
ciples of law to the facts.
Appellants concur with this Court in declaring,
"the controversy devolves upon the second sentenct''
of the telegram from Gindy Manufacturing Con.
pany to Mr. Petty with its surrounding circurn.
stances. It does not devolve upon the doctrine of
promissory estoppel as such, but only to the exten:
that the factual requirements for promissory estop·
pel also apply to the classified fact situation of thi~
case of an innocent or negligent misrepresentatior
of an existing fact situation and the opinion judg·
ment of Gindy as to a future condition to flow there·
from, made with a deliberate intention that the plain·
tiffs would make a substantial loan to Gindy's agent.
Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc., which was done.
To further classify this problem of estoppcl ii'
pais let us observe that it fits into the requiremenE
of liability for negligent representation stated in
the Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft No. 1~
Sec. 628.
One who in the course of his business··:
supplies information for the gui~ance. o'.
others in their business transactions is subJ~ 1
to liability for harm caused to them by theE
reliance upon the information if
(a) he fails to exercise that ca~·e ~nc
competence in obtaining and communicatrnr
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the information which its recipient is justified
in expecting, and
( b) the harm is suffered
( i) by the person or one of the class of
persons for whose guidance the information
was supplied, (Burgess v. Calif. Mutual B. &
L. Ass'n. 1930, 290 P. 1029 and
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance
upon it in a transaction in which it was intended to influence his conduct ....
The estoppel problem in this case is one of
equitable tortious nature. Under the facts the failure
of the duty to provide accuracy of statement to the
inquiring plaintiff becomes the proximate cause of
his loss if he in good faith relied on the carelessly
made representations, and thus defendant and not
plaintiffs must bear the loss. Williston, Liability
for Honest Misrepresentation, (1911) 24 Harv. L.
Rev. 415 and Harper and McNeeley, A Synthesis of
the Law of Misrepresentation, (1938) 22 Minn. Law
Re\·. 939.
Appellants respectfully contend that the controlling errors of the court as to this particular,
rlassified fact situation are:
First, procedurally, the Court erroneously applied the rule that when the trial court dismisses an
action with prejudice and makes findings, the evidence is to be reviewed in the light most favorable
to the findings. Here the rule has no direct application to two of the trial court's findings namely, that
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the defendant was not guilty of fraudulent inte!l'
to deceive and that the1·e was no consideration fui
the promise. The decision of this court clearly imphes
that those two findings have no bearing on an equitable action of reliance. The third finding was that
the representations of "orders in or pending to lllOit
than cover" $17,000 of expected commissions to
Freeway was not false. The documents of Exhibit
6 conclusively show that there were no "orders ...
pending" on September 25, 1965 the date of th~
Gindy telegram, when the usual, ordinary and correct legal meaning is given to the word "orders" u11
which plaintiffs relied. (App. Brief p. 21.) Becaust
of its context the finding regarding falsity cannot
be interpreted to mean anything more than a finding that defendant had no dishonest intention to
deceive, which for purposes of rehearing may br
admitted.
On the matter of reliance the Trial Court would
have found good faith reliance had it made a finding
on that matter. The Court said:
I am not questioning your reliance. Your
evidence is ample on that. (R. 107)
Therefore two findings are immaterial on the
question of liability for negligent misrepresentation.
There is no finding that the reliance was legally
insufficient. Therefore there are no probative find·
ings of fact on which the evidence can be review'.d
favorably or unfavorably to the decision of the tnal
court.
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In the matter of this Court declining to grant
an order for a new trial, the Court erred in citing
"8. Weodon 'V. Pearson" 14 Ut. 2d 45, 376 P. 2d 946.
That case is not in point because the defense in that
case was one of res adjudicata by reason of a prior
judgment which was not appealed and the defense
was found to be a valid one. There is here no issue
of res adjudicata. The case is still pending and appellants arguments for new trial are still probative.
Appellants again respectfully renew their motion
for new trial if the Court shall adhere to its first
opinion that contributory negligence is a defense to
an equitable action of reliance, especially since the
issue of contributory negligence was not considered
or decided by the trial court which is the usual and
proper tribunal to try that kind of issue.
Appellants respectfully contend that this Court
fell into a second and controlling substantive error
of law in that it applied the outmoded doctrine of
contributory negligence as a defense to a wilful,
albeit, negligent or innocent misrepresentation by
which the defendant definitely intended to induce
definite and substantial action by plaintiffs. Appellants contend that the Court should have applied
the rule of "good faith reliance" (similar to that
legal rule in the law of Bills and Notes) which is
the rule of law applied in practically all of the states
except Utah. (Citations later.)
Appellants respectfully contend that this Court
fell into a third and fourth controlling legal errors
in not giving to the words "dealer," and particularly
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to the wo:d "order,_" :~eir established legal meaning
as found m the defm1t10ns of the respective volumes
of Words and Phrases; which meanings are also their
usual and customary meanings as understood by all
businessmen except Mr. Ginsburg and Mr. Walters
of Gindy Manufacturing Company because of their
special method of doing business, unknown to plair.
tiffs.
The definition of "dealer" from Words and
Phrases is "a person who buys and sells automobiles"
(or trailers, etc.) "for himself and on his own account."
Moore v. State, 79 SE. 76, 148 Ga. 45i.
Saunders v. Russel, 78 Tenn. ( 10 Lea.) 293.
In re Hemming (D.C. Miss. 51 F. 2d 850, and
numerous other cases all to the same effect.
For a leading case on the distinction between
persons operating as dealers and those operating as
agents see S. B. McMaster v. Chevrolet Motor Com·
pany, 3 F. 2d 469 (1925).
In this case the evidence is uncontradicte<l and
conclusive that neither G. H. Mickelson nor Freeway
Trailer Sales Inc. ever during the year following
the signing of Mirkelson to become a franchised deal·
er of Gindy ever purchased and resold one Gind)'
trailer on either of their own accounts. That being
true Mickelson did not, as this Court finds, operate
as a franchised dealer. What was the relation of thl
parties involved?
No member of this Court will deny the principle
of law that either prior to the time for performanc1
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cont1·act (or after performance is begun) the
parties may agree that one or both (or the corporation dominated by one of the parties) shall do something different from what the original contract
specified. Williston and Thompson, Contracts, Rev.
ed.; 1938 Vol. 3. Sec. 680.
It was error for the Court to find that the evidence was not offered of a change of parties to the
contract and that Freeway operated as a soliciting
agent of Gindy. It is not a question of offering of
r1·idence - The evidence was offered and was admitted both documentary (See Exhibits 6, summarized p. 21 of App. orig. brief) and by oral testimony
that Freeway did operate as and was approved and
accepted as the soliciting agent of Gindy.

That being the uncontradicted and conclusive
in the case, Freeway was entitled to the
commission Pa1·ned in the Morrison case where the
specifications for an offer became an order by determination of price and by acceptance by Gindy of
a note from Morrison. (See Morrison transaction one of Exhibits 6.) Appellants respectfully contend
they arc entitled to have the law of agency and
'.lssignment ruled in their favor on the Morrison
order and on the Peeble's solicitation for an offer
from Gindy which failed because of their unwarrnntecl delay in perfecting the agent's work to a
completed order.

~\iclence

Thus also it was a controlling error for this
Court by means of interpretation to excise the word
"o1·uer" from the phrase "orders pending" found in
,]
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the Gindy telegram and to i·eplace it by enoneouo
interpretation with the word "negotiations" by gi\.
ing an unusual, non-customary, unnatural, strained
and entirely different meaning to the phrase "orders
pending" than the ordinary prudent businessman
would understand from "orders pending." We respectfully submit that it was error to force plaintiff:
to accept the unnatural meaning adopted by the
Court, namely, that "orders pending" meant not
"orders pending" but meant only "negotiations pending for later hoped-for orders." The writings were
merely solicitations for offers from Gindy. Had tht
written representation by Gindy read "negotiatiom
pending for later hoped-for orders" or "deals in progress" it would have been preposterous for plaintiffi
to have relied; and it is impossible to believe ther
would have relied on any such a representation he·
cause after the first telephone call, it was made clear
to Gindy by the second telephone call that no loan
would be made if Gindy merely stated that they
would only acknowledge an assignment of commis·
sions. A representation of assurance of repayment
was demanded and was received and relied on aml
acted on.
The above controlling errors resulted primaril;,
from the Court's error of applying the old historical
rule of the early nineteenth century of caveat emptor
which did in those years allow the defense of con·
tributory negligence to an action of deceit. The ~en·
eral middle nineteenth century rule is that contnbu·
tory negligence is not a defense to a fraudulent, nor
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a nun-fraudulent, representation which the representator deliberately intends the representee to rely
upon to his substantial detriment. Prosser, Torts,
~ire! ed., Reliance, 370-37 4. Law is more and more
coming to regard substance more than form. Today's
law is more and more caveat venditor. Whether a
reprrsentation intended to produce substantial reliance be fraudulent or non-fraudulent the out-ofpocket damages to the representee relying thereon
will, as in this case, be the same. That is the true
substance of the transaction. It is generally and
should be the substance of the law. This is wherein
the liability arises for negligent or innocent misrepresentation intended to induce a substantial change
of position by the representee.
Additional cumulative errors are:
(a) The Court erred in failing to recognize that
a loan to Freeway Sales Inc. as Gindy's agent would
indirectly benefit the defendant by having its agent
financed by another which is a fact helping to classify different types of representation situations See classes of representation and promissory estoppel situations in the Williston and Harper and McNeeley articles, supra.
(b) The Court erred in holding that plaintiff's
claim for recovery is based on promissory estoppel
as stated earlier. The Court stated plaintiff's position correctly in paragraph 11 when it wrote: "The
controversy devolves upon the second sentence."
Plaintiff's claim of right to recover damages rests
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not on the terms of the dependent and subonlin 8i1
promise but rests solely on good faith relianc(' 11!
plaintiffs on the false representations of Gind~· that
it had received from G. H. Mickelson and or Fihway Sales Inc. "sufficient" ... "ordas in or pt 111 J.
ing to more than cover" a loan of $12,000 which
the telegram was intended to and did induce. (S~e
appellant's reply brief 1-7.)
·
( c) The Court erred in putting any weight u11
the statement in the Monday assignment, that FMway was assigning future earnings "after deals \\Wt
finalized and financing arrangements completed.
There was only talk of an assignment on Saturclat
No assignment was written on September 25, 1962.
The reliance on the representation in the telegram
occurred on that Saturday. The assignment .vas tw
days after the fact and concurrent with the delirn!·
of the check and there was no reason for Mr. Pett:.
to examine it except to see the figure $44,300.00 wa~
there. There is no evidence whatever that the abow
phrase relied on in part by the Court was brought
to the attention of Mr. Petty. Certainly Mr. Michlson would not call that phrase to Mr. Petty's ntlo
tion on M onda.y when he came for the check. He
would not prejudice his chances to get the check. Mr
Petty testified he would not rely on anything Mickelson said. He would rely only on whatever Gindy
would say.
1

1

•

( d) The Court erred in adopting the reasoning
of equating an equitable action based on an innocen:
or negligent misrepresentation with legal suretyship
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or guaranty. Williston's article supra on Liability
for Honest Misrep1·esentation is conclusive that liability for innocent or negligent misrepresentation
has been recognized as distinct equitable action in
equity, at least since Burrows v. Lock, 10 Ves. Jy.
470, 32 Eng. Rep. 927 ( 1905).
THE LAW OF GOOD FAITH RELIANCE
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in the comparatively recent case of May et. al. v. City of Kearney et. ol. ( 1945) 145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W. 2d 448,
upheld an cstoppel in pais against honest representations of city officials that general obligation bonds
would not be issued to purchase a Consumer's Power
Plant and declared the good faith reliance rule as
the governing rule in relying on representations of
opinion, under the circumstances of that case.
The Court said:
Equitable estoppels operate as effectually as technical estoppels. They cannot in the
nature of things be subjected to fixed and
settled rules of universal application, like legal
estoppels, nor hammered by the narrow confines of a technical formula ....
The following however may be ventured
as the sum of all cases: That a person is held
to a representation made or a position assumed, where otherwise inequitable consequences would result to another, who having
a right to do so, under all the circumstances
of the case, has IN GOOD FAITH RELIED
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TH_EREO~. S.uch estoppel ~s founded on mora.hty and JUstic~, and especially concerns conscience and eqmty. 10 R. D. L., p. 236. (1;
N.W. R. 2d, 448, 458.)

A check upon C.J .S. Sec. 59 and the 1964 Supplement, Sec. 59 thereto shows the following state~
as adhering to the good faith reliance rule whid1
necessarily rejects the old contributory negligence
rule: Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Fla., Ga., Ill.,
Ind., Ky., Me., Md., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb.,
N.J., N. Mex., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio., Okla., Ore.,
Pa., R.I., Tenn., Tex., and Wash.
The thoroughly and extensively analyzed cast
of Schafer v. Fraser, ( 1955) 206 Ore. 466, 290 P. 2a.
190, 48 A.L.R. 2d 1087 places the duty of care wherr
it should be and uses the ordinary test of tort lair:
That the representor will be liable to the person pro1imately injured in good faith reliance provided the
representator could forsee as a reasonably prudenr
man that the "language" used will induce conduc:
of the kind that occurred.
Why is good faith reliance justifiable relianee
upon representations deliberately made to an interested inquirer to produce reliance by him to his sunstantial detriment?
The answer lies first in the justice and fairneii
of requiring not only honesty but due care in makin~
representations to an inquirer whom the representoi
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intends shall i·ely and act on the answer to the inquiry.
Williston in his article on Liability for Honest
Representation cites the early case of Burrows v.
Lock, 10 Ves. Jr. 470 32 Eng. Rep. 927 as declaring
the correct rule of liability in such a case as we have
here.
Lord Herschell in the leading English case of
Derry 11. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cases (H.L.) 337,
188 in holding that dishonesty was required for an
action of deceit declared that liability for honest misrepresentation existed in an equitable action on good
faith reliance in a class of actions such as this Petty
case. He wrote,
There is another class of actions which I
must refer to also for the purpose of putting
it aside. I mean those cases where a person
within whose special province it lay to know
a particular fact, has given an erroneous answer to an inquiry made with regard to it by
a person desirous of ascertaining the fact for
the purpose of determining his course accordingly, and had been held bound to make good
the assurance he has given. Burrows v. Lock,
10 Ves. Jr. 470, may be cited as an example,
where a trustee had been asked by an intended
lender, upon the security of a trust fund,
whether notice of any prior incumbrance upon
the fund had been given him. The defendant innocently and honestly gave the answer
that there was no prior encumbrance on the
trust fund which turned out to be false ....
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In cases like this it has been said that th~
the a!1swe1· was honestli
made, m the belief tf1at it was trne afford·~
no defense to the act10n. Accord, Williston &
Thonipson Contrncts, Vol. 5, Sec. 15fl~
(1938) pp. 4208-9.
.,

circum~tances, t~at

The second reason for applying the modem rnle
of liability to honest but careless or inaccurate rep.
resentations intended to induce substantial reliancP
and which do so is well stated by the Arkansas Su.
preme Court in Peoples National Bank of Little Rock
v. Linberger Const. Co., 1951, 219 Ark. 11, 240 S.\Y.
2d 12, 48 A.L.R. 2d 1086 - (cited as the case in
point, plaintiff's reply brief p. 15.) The Court said.
that the development toward increasing actions based
on promissory estoppel which equally applies to equit·
able actions of estoppel in pais based on reliance in
good faith upon a representation of a futurt> ewnt.
is an attempt by courts to keep abreast of
increased moral consciousness of honesty aml
fair representations in all business dealings.
(Cases from part of the states mentioned
above are cited by way of illustration.)
The evolution in the law of deceit to the modern
rule rejecting contributory negligence as a defense
to intended deception is paralleled by similar denl·
opment in actions for negligent or innocent misrep·
resentation in a shift to duty of care and assumptiun
,-,01)
of risk by the representor. Prosser, Torts 3rd ed· 1o ..

I
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The Prosser statement points the way the courts
are going and the way we respectfully submit this
Court should go in deciding loss between a negligent
rrpresentor to a good faith inquirer in this particular class of case.
Prosser writes at pages 372-373:
The last half-century has seen a marked
change in the attitude of the courts toward
the question of justifiable reliance. Earlier
decisions, under the influence of the prevalent
doctrine of "caveat emptor," laid great stress
upon the plaintiff's "duty" to protect himself
and distrust his antagonist, and held that he
was not entitled to rely even upon positive
assertions of fact made by one with whom he
was dealing at arm's length. It was assumed
that any one may be expected to overreach
another in a bargain if he can, and that only
a fool will expect common honesty. Therefore
the plaintiff must make a reasonable investigation, and form his own judgment. The recognition of a new standard of business ethics,
demanding that statements of fact be at least
honestly and carefully made, and in many
cases that they be warranted to be true, has
led to an almost complete shift in this point of
1·iew. Prosser on Torts, 3rd ed.
We respectfully submit that the cases cited by
the Court to support its decision are either distinguishable, hold centra or do not discuss at all the
question of whether the law of good faith reliance
or of contributory negligence should govern.
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True, the Wheat case uses the doctrine of contributory negligence to defeat the general contractor's recovery against the sub-contractor, - the expert on painting. However, although the California
Supreme Court case of Drennan v. Star Paving Company, 333 P. 2d 757 is cited by this Court in deciding
the Wheat case, the references to reasonable reli.
ance are only dicta. The California Court found a
failure of the duty of accuracy of representation
by the defendant sub-contractor and held that "th£
fact that the sub-contractor's bid was the result of
a mistake was no defense." It found no duty of i~
vestigation as did this Court.
The well reasoned Wycoff case rides off on the
special fact of lack of definite and substantial injm~·
and so is distinguishable. The Hilton case is one in
which estoppel is used as a defense not 2.S basis for
a cause of action. Plaintiff's brief pp. 6-7 surnmaries the combination of facts necessary to recover
on an equitable action of reliance. Only good faith
actual reliance is required as in this Petty case when
all the other requirements concur.
Very few courts can and none ought to deny
the forceful reasoning of Williston in rejecting the
doctrine of contributory negligence as a defense to
an equitable action of reliance for damages. He
writes:
Again, the doctrine of contributory negl!·
gence would be troublesome to apply. Is it
contributory negligence for a man to rely on

1
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what he is told by a person in a position to
know, and to fail to make an investigation
for himself? Though many decisions require
that a plaintiff should not have been to foolish in believing what no reasonable man in his
position should believe, it is going too far, both
in reason and on the authorities, to say that a
plaintiff, unless his conduct was not wholly
irrational, should lose his rights because he
failed to make independent investigation and
belieYed what he was told. It should not lie in
the mouth of the man who induced his reliance
to assert that the reliance was negligent. If
a man makes a statement in regard to a matter upon which his hearer may reasonably
suppose he has the means of information, and
that he is speaking with full knowledge, and
the statement is made as part of a business
transaction, or to induce action from which
the speaker expects to gain an advantage, he
should be held liable for his misstatement.
Such a principle most nearly harmonizes the
law of misrepresentation in its various aspects. 22 Harv. L. R. 415, 437.
It was reasonable for Gindy on September 25,
1962 to anticipate as Freeway did that more than
$17,000 commissions could be earned on what Gindy
and Mickelson expected to ultimately materialize
into orders for more than $400,000. That being true
it was reasonable for Mr. Petty to place good faith
reliance that the existing fact situation would produce more than $17,000 in commissions. See Peoples
~ational Bank case supra and C.J.S. Sec. 80 approving recovery on honest representation of future con-
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dition based on judgment opinion regarding prese!I'
fact situation.

Let's summarize. The fact situation in eacl;
equitable action of reliance on negligent, innr1ce 11 1
misrepresentations must be carefully classified tG
apply estoppel i11 pais. The induced loan-of-moner
cases have all granted recovery: - Burrows cas~.
1805 supra; the Burgess case, 1930 supra, and Pen.
pie's National Bank case, 1951 supra. Also approna
in Derry v. Peek, H.L., 1889 supra.

The six factual requirements given by Pomero.r.
Equity Jurisprudence, 1941, Sec. 805, ( App's Briti
6-7) declare the risk of carefulness is on the rep·
resentator. It is sufficient if the circumstances ar1
such "that knowledge of them (the facts) is necessarily imputed to him." The honest inquirPr 11iti1
a known interest has no duty of im'estigation. H
need only honestly rely, unless as Williston ai:·:
Prosser state, his reliance is so foolish that no rea·
sonable man would have relied under the circum·
stances. The reason for the good faith rule in equin
is that the representor deliberately intends that hii
language shall produce the specific substantial anu
detrimental change of position which occurs, ani!
the damages if the representation be negligenth
or innocently made are the same as if it were done
fraudulently. This situation imposes the equitabl~ ·
duty of carefulness.

1

1
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Appellants respectfully pray for an order for
a new trial or for application of the good faith rule.
Respectfully submitted,

A. LADRU JENSEN,
RICHARDS, BIRD and HART
Attorneys for Appellants

